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Abstract
An important requirement of the new generation of telecommunication protocols is, that they should
be able to adapt themselves to the changes of the environment without human interaction. The main
problem of the system, which is built up by self-adaptive protocols is the question of stability. Results
in the field of game theory, especially which are related to non-cooperative games could offer a good
solution for this problem. In this article I attempt to introduce some kinds of application of game
theory in case of self-adaptive telecommunication protocols.
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1. Introduction
In our days’ almost saturated telecom market the main point in increasing one
service provider’s role is the offer of more and more advanced services. That is
the reason why service developers attempt to create services, which make the best
of the available resources of the telecommunication network. It is not an easy
task: beside the services which often have to deal with delay sensitive multimedia
content, the attendant environment is largely heterogeneous because of the large
scale of network element and end-user device types.
The basics of a telecommunication software are protocols. Protocols are the
semantic, syntactic and timing rules of the communication and they are represented
as finite state machines. These rules has to be created to be flexible, so that the
protocols fit the best to the actual state of the network. It means that the protocols
– and hereby the services also – have to be adapted to their environment. Section
2 deals with self-adaptive protocols and examines their possible role and their
requirements in the future of telecommunication networks.
However, the software elements, which change their properties to adapt them-
selves to the environment raise an other problem: will the final system be stable or
it becomes unstable? I attempt to apply the results of game theory for answering
this question. In Section 3 I show why I chose non-cooperative games for this task.
Section 4 introduces some examples for situations in the field of telecommu-
nication where self-adaptive protocols can reach the stable points of the system by
the use of game theory. Finally in Section 5 I present two methods for finding the
equilibrium points of some of the previously introduced examples.
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2. The Role of Self-adaptive Protocols
The continuous development of technology creates more and more challenges for
telecommunication software developers. The quick spreading of mobility increases
the importance of ad-hoc networks, where mobile devices can join and secede from
in dynamical manner. Moreover mobile terminals have to be able to communicate
with the wired ones, and this fact also increases the heterogeneity what telecom-
munication has to face.
There is also a new feature: different types of contents have to be transmitted
through the network even in case of mobile telecom, because also mobile devices
are capable of handling multimedia contents. We can see that the actual challenge
of telecommunication is to be ready for the discrepancies not only in the hardware
but in the software field too.
The advantages of the technological development, what enrich services also
cause some problems. If we want to use a new feature, we often have to make
compromise in opposite virtues of the transmission. The developers’ aim is to
ensure the optimum for the user. (1) During the communication using mobile and
portable devices long enough battery lifetime has to be ensured. The question is:
which part of the service can be sacrificed for sparing energy. (2) Ad-hoc networks
should be reliable, stable, self-organizing networks. Question could be: how do the
communication entities co-operate in an ad-hoc network with each other, if they
have different goals? (3) In the heterogeneous environment the telecommunication
software has to be portable. What should be included in the software for making it
portable reserving simplicity because of the restricted resources of mobile devices?
(4) In our days mobile networks should deliver delay sensitive enhanced content
with appropriate QoS through an unreliable, non-deterministic, fluctuating medium,
what is electromagnetic wave. One of the most important questions is how to share
the unreliable radio channels among more entities to ensure the desired Quality of
Service for each of them.
Traditional static software is not the best solution, usually there is not any
ideal constant parameter which would give the most optimal results for the whole
communication time in a changing environment. Out and away the protocol has to
adapt itself to the changes in execution time.
For the adaptation the protocol needs information about the environmental
changes. In the followings we will see, that traditional layered protocol model is
perhaps not the best solution for that.
2.1. Information for Adaptation
Nowadays network architecture is created by layered protocols, they have their
strictly separated functionality and they offer services to the upper layers. In this
model communication takes place only between the neighbouring layers (Fig. 1a).
The modular structure was applied because of the simplicity during its development.
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It makes it possible to design complex systems easier than without the layered
structure of the protocols. Although in case of the protocols, which should be
capable to adapt themselves automatically to the changes of the environment, this
model suffers of the lack of information sharing across the protocol layers.
Let’s consider the case in which an application’s information request depends
on the status of the network. If the underlying network is unreliable, the requested
content is only a textual one, otherwise the application wants to get multimedia
content from a web page. This solution would improve the response time and
decrease network congestion. If we refer to the OSI reference model, application
layer needs information from the network layer in this example (Fig. 1b). It requires
direct communication between the third and the seventh layer.
In an other case, the method which way the information source and the channel
is coded for compressed image transmission depends also on the quality of the
wireless channel. Compressed image is very sensible for transmission failures, and
wireless systems can be characterized by limited bandwidth and high bit error rate.
It is the reason for adapting the applied source and channel coding technics to the
actual reliability level of the channel.
As a third example, the adaptive multipath routing in a network needs infor-
mation about the state of the physical channel. Based on these data the resources
of a network could be used in a more effective way and the offered services could
have higher quality.
In the previous three examples protocols of the higher level layers have to be
informed by the lower level layers. In the cross layer design methodology [1] it is
called upward information sharing, and it is shown in Fig. 1b. Naturally there are
situations, which fit to the opposite direction.
Better performance could be reached if the network layer knew about the
expected communication load. If the application layer shares this information with
the protocol layer, which is responsible for resource allocation, the network can
apply more effective dynamical allocation strategies. In this case the information
sharing happens in downward direction (Fig. 1c).
The more information an adaptive protocol has about the environment, the
most effective way it can adapt itself to the actual situation. Cross layer design offers
greater amount of information for self-adaptive protocols than the usual design to
choose the values of their parameters. In the followings we will examine, what the
essence of self-adaptive protocols is, how they handle the information they get to
reach their optimal performances.
2.2. Self-adaptive Protocols
As we have seen, self-adaptive (SA) protocols are protocols which attempt to do
their best dynamically based on the information they get from their environments.
The definition of self-adaptive software is: ‘The self-adaptive software evaluates
its own behaviour and changes behaviour when the evaluation indicates that it is
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Fig. 1. Cross layer network architecture design
not accomplishing what the software intended to do or when better functionality or
performance is possible.’ [2] The evaluation is mostly based on the feedback, which
is got from the environment. The structure of a self-adaptive protocol is presented
in Fig. 2, based on the work of Katalin Tarnay [3].
Fig. 2. Structure of a self-adaptive protocol
The protocol gets the feedback via the Receiver. The response of the environ-
ment, which is based on the behaviour of the system, is analysed by Self Monitor
and the result is passed to Dynamic Dispatch. This unit is responsible for choosing
the desired State Transition Table or Data Flow Graph for the work of the protocol
as a response on the results of the monitoring process. Finally the Controller super-
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vises the protocol functions based on these parameters. This description shows that
both the protocol’s static properties and the dynamical ones are adjusted according
to the environment.
3. Stability of Systems Built up by Self-adaptive Protocols
A self-adaptive protocol could work in a more efficient way than a static one. After
all systems which are built up by self-adaptive protocols may suffer some problems.
Let’s consider a communication system, which is created by self-adaptive agents.
Usually each agent of the system changes her SA protocols’ parameters in a selfish
way to maximize the user’s utility. In this dynamical system stable points have to
be found avoiding from the instable behaviour, that can be resulted because of the
continuous changes of protocol parameters. The main question is: how to find the
stable points of the communication network?
I attempt to apply the results of game theory [4] as a possible answer on this
question. There is rich literature on finding the equilibrium point of a game. In a
game there are players who do have their well defined individual goals which can
be characterized by utility functions. Each player chooses and carries out actions
at her decision points towards maximization of her utility. The main point in the
game is that a player’s payoff depends not only on his decision but also on the
decision of the other players of the game. In the ‘communication game’ the game is
the communication process itself, the players are the self-adaptive communication
agents, and their strategies are represented by the settings of protocol parameters.
Payoffs can be characterized by the resulted communication features (inverse of bit
error rate, inverse of transmission time, etc.), and the goal of a player is to maximize
his payoff. This goal causes the fact, that the players compete with each other, and
they do not co-operate. It means that the communication game is a non-cooperative
game.
The theoretical background of non-cooperative games is elaborated, espe-
cially by the work of John Nash: the Nash-equilibrium means the solution of
non-cooperative games. A game reaches it’s Nash-equilibrium, if no player has
other strategy profile which results him in a better payoff in case of no change in
the other players’ strategy profile. In our case our task can be seen: to find the
Nash-equilibrium of the communication game. It is sure that this game has got at
least one Nash-equilibrium, because Nash theorem says: in case of mixed strategies
every non-cooperative game has (at least one) Nash-equilibrium.
Now it can be seen in which direction to start. There are two main questions
remaining: (1) What kinds of communication situations need game theory? (2)
How to determine the stable points of these situations? In the next two sections I
attempt to give some examples as part of the answers on these questions.
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4. Non-cooperative Games in Telecommunication
In the previous sections I have already presented situations where some features of
a telecommunication service had to compete with other ones. In this section I give
four concrete examples for applying game theory to find the stable states of some
dynamically changeable situations especially in the field of mobile telecommuni-
cation.
4.1. Random Access in Ad-hoc Wireless Networks
One challenging field of mobile telecommunication is ad-hoc networking. These
self-organizing mobile networks are created by devices which may enter and leave
the network continuously. In these circumstances a stable, well functioning distrib-
uted network has to be created, which is able to adapt itself to the permanent change
of its environment. The self-configuration of the network is based on the individual
actions of the attendant mobile devices. While they attempt to carry out their own
tasks the whole network should stay in a stable state. To transmit some data, the
device has to get access to the channel at first. If there are more than one active
devices which intend to transmit data at the same time in the network, there will
be collision on the channel. The question is when should a device attempt to start
the transmission. It is a good situation for involving the results of non-cooperative
game theory [5]. Here the different devices are the players and they have their own
retransmission strategies. In this game we can measure the payoff of a player as the
inverse of his complete transmission time. Using game theory in case of random ac-
cess seems to be a useful idea. MacKenzie and Wicker developed a game-theoretic
version of slotted Aloha [6], the application of their result in case of more complex
random access methods is a promising research area.
4.2. Energy Conservation of Mobile Devices in Fading Environment
Another important field of mobile telecommunication research is the field of energy
conservation. Because of mobility the mobile devices have to be small and easy
units, even so they have to ensure long service time without recharging the bat-
tery. This means that they have to take the advantage of their transmission policy’s
dynamism as optimally as possible. The fluctuating and fading properties of the
wireless channel and the usually bursty data source make it more difficult. The
mobile devices have to change their channel sensitivities in the way which is pow-
erful enough to do their transmission tasks correctly, but requires as small pieces
of energy as possible. This situation can also be represented by a game, where the
strategies of the players are their transmission policies and their outcomes can be
measured by the amount of successfully transmitted bits during battery lifetime.
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The outcome depends both on the fluctuation of the channel in time, in frequency
and in space, and also on the co-channel interference besides the individual strategy.
4.3. Fair Capacity Sharing Ensuring Appropriate QoS
The 3rd generation mobile systems make multimedia data transmission possible.
This means that mobile users are able to have resort to services with very different
QoS requirements. It results that the network has to multiply data streams with
different bit rates to transmit them through the wireless channel. For the sake
of decreasing the amount of control information the medium access is usually not
controlled by the base station, but it is decentralized. That way a situation is created
where the communicating units fight for getting such a wide bandwidth, which is
enough to ensure the required quality during the transmission. In addition they want
to get it as cheap as possible. (Usually the cost of a very high data rate transmission
can be extremely big.) The strategies of the players are medium access and data rate
policies in this communication game, while the utility function can be determined
as a metric of the achieved QoS reduced by the price of that.
4.4. Aspect-oriented Telecommunication Software with Time Constraints
In contrast to object-oriented paradigm aspect-oriented programming (AOP) gives
the advantage of dynamic software architecture creation. Besides the core software
we may develop different aspects with different functions and depending on the
needs or on some conditions we can include them into the core software. If we
think of an OO software, the clearing of the screen procedure may crosscut several
objects. Screen clearing can be implemented in one aspect. AOP can be extremely
important in telecommunication industry where the offered additional services vary
day by day. The aspects can be developed in different parts of the world, AOP makes
distributed development possible. Moreover the use of aspects offers the possibility
to change the architecture of a software in runtime.
Crosscutting concerns can be modularized as aspects and they can be added
to the software at join points if we want. The decision can be adapted to the actual
state of the environment. When we consider error handling aspects and the critical
parameter is the running time of the software, the situation can be described by
a game as follows: The strategy of players is their aspect waving policies at join
points and the set of the game’s outcomes is consisted of the reciprocal of the sum
of the aspects’ execution times at all join points.
In the next section I present a method for determining the equilibrium point(s)
of this game, and next to that I give an other possible solution for finding Nash-
equilibrium in case of continuous strategies, e.g. in case of the game presented
in 4.3.
230 T. DULAI
5. Determination of Nash-Equilibrium
In this section I present two different methods for determining the Nash-equilibrium
of a game. The first one can be applied for games with discrete strategies, the
example I use is the aspect-oriented game presented in 4.4, and the second one will
give the solution of games with continuous strategies. In this case it is applied for
the fair capacity sharing game, which was introduced in 4.3.
5.1. Solution of the ‘Aspect-Oriented’ Game
An AO telecommunication software with time constraints can be considered as a
game. Let’s have a look at the problem, which was introduced in 4.4. There is a
software which has more components: the core software and some aspects. In the
core software there are joint points, where aspects can be connected. We use an
aspect at a joint point, if we want to use the function of the aspect at that point.
Naturally, the execution of the aspect takes time. Each time the software runs, the
core part will be executed. In contrast to this, aspects are used only if the conditions
are fulfilled, which guard the joint points, where the aspects are connected.
Let us suppose that the aspects are used for error handling in this case, and
the quick execution has the same importance than the application of the aspects.
It means that we have to balance between the fastness and the correctness of the
software. The game which models this situation is the following: the players are
the error handling aspects. Each player has two possible actions: the aspect is either
applied at a joint point or not. There are aspects, which are related to each other:
if one of them is executed, the other one has to be executed too or it is forbidden
to execute the second one. There are some joint points in the core software and
the goal is to minimize the maximal possible time interval which is needed for the
execution of the aspects at the joint points. It means that the payoff is the sum of
the reciprocal of execution times at all joint points.
The players of this game are driven by their own interests, it is a non-
cooperative game. To find the game’s equilibrium, I attempted to use mixed strate-
gies. In case of clear strategies the players can choose between their strategies only
to apply one of them or not (in our case it means two strategies: execution or no
execution), however in case of mixed strategies a probability distribution is assumed
over the clear actions. Nash theorem says that any finite game has mixed-strategy
Nash-equilibrium. It means, that if we assign probabilities to the aspects’ actions
at the joint points, the game has to have Nash-equilibrium at least in case of one
possible probability distribution. Fig. 3 shows, what likelihood it has, that an aspect
is executed at a certain joint point.
In the figure we can see that there are M joint points in the core software and
we’ve got N error handling aspects which can be waved into the core software. The
likelihood of applying aspect j at joint point k is pj,k . As it was mentioned earlier,
the likelihood of some aspect’s use can depend on other aspects’ use. It means that
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Fig. 3. Mixed strategies in case of the ‘aspect-oriented’ game
there may be relations between the likelihood values in the table. It depends on the
concrete situation, on the concrete software. The required time for executing all
the aspects, which are applied at joint point k is
Tk =
∑
pj,k ∗ tj,k (1)
if tj,k denotes the time needs at joint point k to execute aspect j . Based on this,
we are able to determine the desired likelihood values in a given situation to get
the optimal result. In our example we want to reach the case, where the overall
execution time is minimal. It means, that we have to find the worst case, where the
execution of aspects at a joint point takes the most time and we have to find the best
case of the worst cases. That is the minimization of the maximal time-interval used
for aspect-execution at joint points. Formally:
opt = min
∑
k
max Tk = min
∑
k
max
∑
pj,k ∗ tj,k (2)
It is a minimax exercise. Solving it, we reach the Nash-equilibrium of the game.
Nash-equilibrium is the state of a game, where nobody is interested in changing his
own strategy unless anybody else does it. The solution has this property, because
if any player changes his strategy (e.g. executes further aspects at a joint point), it
may result in longer execution time, so the outcome of the game may decrease.
5.2. Solution of Games with Continuous Strategies
There are games, where we can not apply the method which was presented in 5.1
for finding the equilibrium point, because the number of the actions, which the
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players can carry out is infinite, so we should assign likelihood to infinite number
of actions. Usually players have to choose their actions from an interval - which
contains infinite number of possible values for the player (e.g. 0 - 10 Mbit/s) - in case
of this kind of games. These are games with continuous strategies [7]. Fair capacity
sharing game, which was presented in 4.3 belongs to this class of games, because
the transmission quality of a communication agent can vary its level continually
within an interval.
In fair capacity game the players want to transmit data through the fluctuating
wireless medium. Their income is in relation with the bandwidth they get and the
time it takes to push the data through the channel. In fact, we may think of the
quality as the bit rate of the transmission. However, the higher quality costs more
than the lower. An agent’s income decreased by this cost results the agent’s profit.
Each agent’s goal is to maximize its profit.
For the sake of simplicity let us suppose that there are only two communication
agents in the system. The given solution is well applicable also for systems, which
have more than two agents, we only have to work in more dimensions. Let denote
Q1 the quality level of the first agent’s transmission and Q2the second one’s. The
quality of service is influenced by both the result of medium access and the data
rate policy of the agents. To visualize the way of the solution, let us suppose that
the function which expresses the communication income of a quality unit can be
described as follows:
I = 10 − Qt if Qt < 10, (3)
I = 0 otherwise,
where
Qt = Q1 + Q2. (4)
It means, that if the sum of the desired bit rates of the two agents is over a limit (e.g.
the capacity of the channel, which is 10 units in this example), then none of the two
agents has profit. If the sum of the agents’ desired bit rates is small, the income
can be a great value (e.g. the unused capacity of the channel can be sold to other
firms). Naturally, the transmission needs resources, which have their prices. For
the sake of simplicity let’s consider the case where the cost is linearly proportional
to the transmitted bits. Let it be expressed by
C(Qi) = 3 ∗ Qi (5)
for both agents. It means, that the cost of a quality unit is 3 units. Based on
the previously defined functions the communication profit (5i) of agent i can be
derived as follows:
5i(Q1,Q2) = I ∗ Qi − C(Qi) = (10 − (Q1 + Q2)) ∗ Qi − 3 ∗ Qi (6)
It means that the profit – a metric of QoS – of one agent depends not only on its
own desired transmission quality but also on its desired quality of the other agent’s
transmission.
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Each agent wants to make his profit maximum. This information is part of
the common knowledge. It means, that agent1 knows, that if its moves first and
determines a quality level for itself, agent2 chooses the point of its reduced state
space, which makes its profit maximum. Before explaining it graphically, let’s get
acquainted with isoprofit curves!
The isoprofit curve means the collection of points, which belong to the same
profit value of an agent. Based on the profit function (6) we can determine the
isoprofit curves of the agents as it is illustrated in Figs. 4 and 5. Fig. 4 shows some
isoprofit curves of agent2.
    / 2221 3))(10(0 QQQQ  /
       / 2221 3))(10(2 QQQQ  /
Fig. 4. Isoprofit curves of communication agent2
If the profit value of agent2 is equal to zero, it means that
52(Q1,Q2) = 0 (7)
(10 − (Q1 + Q2)) ∗ Q2 − 3 ∗ Q2 = 0 (8)
Let us suppose that Q2 6= 0:
10 − Q1 − Q2 − 3 = 0 (9)
If the profit value of agent2 is equal to 2:
(10 − (Q1 + Q2)) ∗ Q2 − 3 ∗ Q2 = 2 (10)
7 ∗ Q2 − Q1 ∗ Q2 − Q
2
2 = 2 (11)
Q1 =
7 ∗ Q2 − Q
2
2 − 2
Q2
(12)
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Fig. 5. Isoprofit curves of communication agent1
Similarly, Fig. 5 shows some isoprofit curves of agent1.
With the help of isoprofit curves we are able to determine the optimal level
of the desired quality of transmission. Let us suppose that agent1 sets 3 as the level
of its transmission’s quality. It can be seen in Fig. 6 as a line:
Q1 = 3. (13)
Now agent2 can choose only points as its transmission quality, which fit onto the
line. Among the points of the line there is only one point, which results the highest
profit value for agent2 in these circumstances. This point is the point of agent2’s
isoprofit curve, which curve is tangential to Q1 = 3 line. If agent2 chose other
point, the point would fit onto agent2’s isoprofit curve, which curve represents less
profit value for agent2. By solving the maximalization problem of agent2’s profit
function, we can determine the set of all optimal reaction of agent2 to all level of
agent1’s quality selection. This set of points is the curve which is called the reaction
curve of agent2. It can be seen in Fig. 6.
The solution contains the partial derivation of agent2’s profit function with
respect to Q2
∂52
∂Q2
= 7 − Q1 − 2 ∗ Q
∗
2 (14)
and the finding of the value of Q2*, which makes the derived function equal to zero.
7 − Q1 − 2 ∗ Q
∗
2 = 0 (15)
Q∗2 =
7−Q1
2
, if Q1 ≤ 7
Q∗2 = 0, if Q1 > 7.
(16)
Q2* is the reaction curve of agent2.
∂52
∂Q2
= (10 − (Q1 + Q
∗
2)) − Q
∗
2 − 3 = 0
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7 − Q1
2
, if Q1 ≤ 7
Q∗2 = 0, if Q1 > 7
03))(10( *2
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Fig. 6. Reaction curve of communication agent2
In game theory we suppose that the players are rational decision makers. It
means that they choose the strategy, which maximizes their profits. That’s why
agent2 will choose a point, which fits onto her reaction curve, and agent1 knows
this fact. Based on this information agent1 can determine his optimal level of
transmission quality: he has to find his isoprofit curve, which is tangential to the
reaction curve of agent2. If we have a look at agent2’s reaction curve (Fig. 7), we
can realize, that the point, in which agent1’s isoprofit curve is tangential to agent2’s
reaction curve, is the best choice of agent1. The other points of agent2’s reaction
curve fit onto agent1’s isoprofit curves, which mean less profit for agent1. To find
the equilibrium point of the game, we have to find agent1’s isoprofit curve, whose
extreme fits onto agent2’s reaction curve. It means that we have to replace Q2 with
the function of agent2’s reaction curve (Q2*) in agent1’s profit function, and we
have to derive the function after that with respect to Q1, as it is illustrated in Fig. 7.
51(Q1,Q2) = (10 − (Q1 + Q2)) ∗ Q1 − 3 ∗ Q1 (17)
51(Q1,Q2) = (10 − (Q1 +
7 − Q1
2
)) ∗ Q1 − 3 ∗ Q1 (18)
51(Q1,Q2) =
7
2
∗ Q1 −
Q21
2
(19)
∂51
∂Q1
= 3, 5 − Q1 (20)
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If we make this result equal to zero, we find agent1’s optimal choice as his desired
transmission quality level.
3, 5 − Q1 = 0 (21)
Q1 = 3, 5 (22)
If we replace Q1 with 3,5 in agent2’s reaction curve, we get agent2’s optimal
choice.
Q2 =
7 − 3, 5
2
= 1, 75 (23)
∂51
∂Q1
= 3, 5 − Q1 = 0
51(Q1,Q2) = (10 − (Q1 + Q2)) ∗ Q1 − 3 ∗ Q1
Q1 = 3, 5
7 − Q1
2
, if Q1 ≤ 7
Q∗2 = 0, if Q1 > 7
In this example the Nash-equilibrium of the game is the point, where the transmis-
05,3 1
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Fig. 7. Determination of the equilibrium point of game with continuous strategies
sion quality of agent1 is set to 3,5 units, while agent2’s transmission quality is at
1,75 units.
The presented two examples give methods for finding a communication game’s
Nash-equilibrium both with discrete and with continuous strategies and they are use-
ful methods for finding stable points of communication games, which are based on
self-adaptive protocols.
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6. Conclusion
In this article I attempt to highlight that in the future of telecommunication a big
role of self-adaptive protocols is expected. The main question of them is how to
determine the stable points of a system, which is built up by self-adaptive protocols,
if these protocols change their behaviours continuously to adapt themselves to the
actual state of the system’s environment.
I attempt to answer this question by applying the results of the game theory,
especially by using the research issues of the area of non-cooperative games. Agents
of a telecommunication system usually compete with each other, that’s why Nash-
equilibrium can give the stable points of a communication game. Nash-equilibrium
represents the stable point(s) of a non-cooperative game.
I introduced four game models in the field of telecommunication and showed
examples for finding Nash-equilibrium of a system both in case of mixed discrete
strategies and in case of continuous strategies.
Based on this work I’m on developing adaptive game-theoretic protocol for
mobile telecommunication and I plan to simulate it in NS (Network Simulator) in
the future.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Katalin Tarnay for the tremendous help and
encouragement she gave me during my work and studies.
References
[1] HAAS, Z. J., Design Methodologies for Adaptive and Multimedia Networks, IEEE Communi-
cation Interactive, 39/11, November 2001.
[2] ROBERTSON,P.– LADDAGA, R. – SHROBE, H., Introduction: The First International Workshop
on Self-Adaptive Software, IWSAS 2000, Springer-Verlag, New York (2001).
[3] TARNAY, K., Self-adaptive protocol, In Self-adaptive Software: Applications, Second Inter-
national Workshop, IWSAS 2001, Balatonfüred, Hungary, May 2001, Revised Papers, 2614,
pp. 106–112, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2001.
[4] MYERSON, R. B., Game Theory - Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, London,
England, 1991.
[5] MACKENZIE, A. B. – WICKER, S.B., Game Theory and the Design of Self-Configuring, Adap-
tive Wireless Networks, IEEE Communications Magazine, November 2001, pp. 126-131.
[6] MACKENZIE, A. B. – WICKER, S.B., Selfish Users in Aloha: A Game Theoretic Approach,
Proceedings of the IEEE VTC, Oct 2001, pp. 1354–57.
[7] BIERMAN, H. S. – FERNANDEZ, L., Game Theory with Economic Applications, Addisen -
Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Massachusetts, 1993.
